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Introduction
In experimental markets we often observe that the amount of information about their competitors that is provided to markets participants can drastically influence their behavior.
Most authors argue that different information causes different learning possibilities that are crucial for the success or failure of coordination. The reported effect of detailed information in such studies, however, is ambiguous and depends on the market design. Huck et al. (2000) , for example, find in an experimental oligopoly market that detailed information about rivals' actions leads to less cooperation than aggregate information (average quantities and prices), especially in the case of quantity competition. They explain this through imitation of successful firms. Similar results are found by Altavilla et al. (2006) , who also study the dynamics of imitation and, furthermore, introduce aspiration rules as an explanation for behavior when only averaged information is known. In this view, the average profit in all markets in the previous period serves as an aspiration level. Offerman et al. (2002) , on the contrary, demonstrate that detailed information about others' quantities leads to a higher frequency of collusive outcomes than aggregate information (sum of quantities). Their explanation for this observation also refers to imitation learning, but this time to imitation of exemplary firms that decrease their quantity to guide the other firms to cooperation. Selten and Apesteguia (2005) consider a location game with price competition on a circle. They explain the behavior of their subjects with a combination of cooperative attempts and imitation of successful players.
In this paper, we consider a Bertrand price setting oligopoly, where theory predicts prices at the equilibrium to be equal to marginal costs. The Bertrand Paradox, however, contradicts this theoretical prediction with the observation that in real-life pricing situations, firms indeed set prices above marginal costs and face positive profits. Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) illustrate this contradiction in a well-known experimental study. They transfer the Page 4 of 35 A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
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Bertrand situation into a game where participants have to choose a number (price) from the interval [2:100]. The one who chooses the lowest number wins an amount of money equal to the price whereas all others receive zero. The game is repeated for ten rounds with a random matching of interacting groups in every round from a pool of overall 12 participants.
In their paper, Dufwenberg and Gneezy find that with groups of three or four participants, the winning price converges to the lowest possible value while for the duopoly case the downward movement stops after some rounds and reverses into an increase of prices instead. The experimental setup of this game can also be translated into a first-price auction mechanism.
1
The first-price auction experiment of Ockenfels and Selten (2005) has a similar design, except for the fact that they consider two different private resale values. In their experiment they find that bidding is more aggressive when only winning (but no losing) bids of their auction are made known to the bidders. Neugebauer and Selten (2006) find similar results in an experiment where subjects played against computerized opponents.
In the experimental sessions of Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) participants were seated in a classroom. In every round they wrote their bid and their registration number on a coupon.
All coupons were put into a box, and then groups were randomly drawn from the box by a neutral monitor. All bids and the related registration numbers were written on a blackboard to ensure public information and to demonstrate that no cheating by the experimenter was possible. This proceeding, however, has been questioned by other authors (see, for example, Huck 2004) because the experimental setup with public information and visual contact enables not only learning, as intended by the experimenters, but also unintended group dynamics. By placing high bids participants can demonstrate to others their willingness to collude. Indeed, Dufwenberg and Gneezy report a relatively high number of bids of 100 that can be interpreted as (successful) attempts to establish coordination between all 12
1 Therefore, we will use "price" and "bid" as synonyms in our paper, always meaning the number between 2 and 100 a participant chooses.
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participants. The ability of the experiment to demonstrate the Bertrand Paradox might therefore be questioned because leadership by example can also explain the observation of higher prices than in Nash equilibrium.
In their 2002 paper, Dufwenberg and Gneezy return to the information problem. They repeat the duopoly treatment, this time providing different levels of information history. In the full information treatment (FULL), data from the duopoly case of the 2000 experiment is used again. In a semi-information treatment (SEMI), only the winning bids are announced instead of making all bids publicly known. Finally, in a no-information treatment (ZERO), information is reduced further to the matching structure and the registration number of the winning participants without announcing the respective bids. Both reductions of the available information history lead to drastic decreases in cooperation. Thus, Dufwenberg and Gneezy conclude that high cooperativeness in the full information treatment of the 2000 experiment is explained by behavior that is similar to signaling. Following their argument, in every period players have the choice whether they want to play seriously (a best reply to the expected bids of the other participants) or to send the group a signal of their willingness to cooperate and therefore to set a high bid. If this action is well interpreted and accepted by other participants, it can pay off to abstain from today's chance to make a profit in order to gain larger profits in future periods.
In this paper, we follow some of the notions and extend the experiment of Dufwenberg and Gneezy in two ways. First, we modify the information that participants receive about surrounding markets to see whether this information is necessary for coordination. Second, we extend the duration of the experiment in order to consider group dynamics over a longer period of time.
In the first part of our series of experiments, we use a design very similar to Dufwenberg and A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
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Gneezy, but focus on other aspects of information provision. Similar to the question in their 2002 paper, we ask whether information about the whole group of participants is crucial for successful tacit coordination. In contrast to their study, we provide participants with information about the decision of their direct opponent, but remove information about the rest of the group for the following reason: hiding all losing bids not only prevents coordination within the group, but also affects the participants' individual learning processes. Decreasing bids in the semi-information treatment can just as well be explained by imitation of successful strategies; participants only see the low bids of the auction winners but not the (possibly large) difference to the higher losing bids. They can only learn from successful bids that won an auction, but they are prevented from learning from lost opportunities when the own bid was much smaller than that of the opponent (see Selten and Buchta 1999) . Thus, with our information set we allow for different learning dynamics than Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2002) because in our experiment, winners can learn from lost opportunities as they know the distance to their opponents' bids.
Additionally, we computerize most sessions to exclude potential effects of tacit face-to-face coordination. Though participants in a classroom experiment are not allowed to talk to each other, they might nevertheless be able to communicate in some visual way and, thus, establish a higher degree of cooperative-mindedness (see Bohnet and Frey 1999) . Conducting the experiment in a computer lab allows us to diminish such tacit coordination. Table 1 summarises the treatments of our experiment.
In the new treatment with no information about the rest of the group, we find that bids decrease constantly over the whole duration of the game. Thus, we can show that information about somebody's own lost opportunities is not sufficient to establish cooperation. Tacit coordination works solely with information about the whole group. Only in the sessions with A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t full information we observe (as Dufwenberg and Gneezy) a bid increase in the second half of the game after an initial decline of bids, no matter whether the session is conducted in the computer lab or with paper and pencil. We will illustrate that an extended variant of Selten and Buchta's learning direction theory can explain the differences between our treatments.
In sections 3.1 and 3.2 we will describe the effects of different information provision and apply learning direction theory to our data.
In the second part of our experimental series, we extend the duration of some sessions to see how participants continue their play once they reached a high bid level. We might think that they just needed some time to coordinate and, once they have learned, remain at relatively high bids. However, it could also be argued that high average bids imply a stronger temptation to lower their bid because the possible profits from undercutting have increased. Since a bid decrease from a very high level is very tempting and since another bid increase from a very low level is cheap in comparison to the possible profits from serious play, we could expect that bids fluctuate between the two levels. A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
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others will be discussed in the second part of our analysis in sections 3.3 and 3.4. Section 4 concludes.
Experimental Design
In our experiment we focus on the importance of group dynamics and leadership by example for success of collusion in the Dufwenberg and Gneezy game. The primary goal of our experiment is to find out whether population feedback is necessary to enhance cooperation. In numbers and all other participants' bids, however, remain unknown in this treatment so that group dynamics cannot occur. Thus, the participants receive all the information necessary to learn from successful bids as well as from lost opportunities. This is the key difference of this experiment from the SEMI and ZERO treatments of Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2002) .
In contrast to these treatments, even in our LOW treatment both participants in a market, winner and loser, know the distance to their opponent's bid, which is particularly important A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
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in the case of winners who had a much lower bid than their opponent. They win much less than they could if they would have chosen a higher bid only a little lower than that of their opponent. At the same time, we can control for the effects that information may generate for the interaction of different markets. In our LOW treatment, participants have very limited opportunities to influence decision making within their group since only their respective opponent would see the distinctive action, not the group of all other participants. Participants were recruited from undergraduate classes of different subjects; they had no previous knowledge of similar games. In the computer treatments, we had twelve participants per session, whereas in the paper and pencil treatment, there was one additional participant, called "monitor", whose main task it was, as in the Dufwenberg and Gneezy experiments, to draw the bids from a box to ensure that we could not cheat with the matching procedure. 
Experimental results
Initial bids in the first period do not significantly differ across all sessions of our experiment.
Here, we also include the data from Dufwenberg and Gneezy's (2000) sessions 2a and 2b, which were conducted in the same way as our PP treatment, into the analysis, calling their treatment D/G. Average bids in the first period are within the interval from 33.50 to 59.58.
In a Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test we cannot reject the null hypothesis that all samples come from the same distribution at any reasonable significance level (d.f. = 18, p-value = 0.8184).
The effect of different information provision
The first question we want to answer is whether tacit coordination fails if we provide participants only with information about the behavior of their direct opponent but not about the rest of the group. Between the treatments with different information provision, the experiment shows a remarkable difference in bidding behavior. Figures 1 and 2 show the average (winning) bids in treatments with full information. Average bids and average winning bids follow very similar patterns. Therefore, the detailed description will concentrate only on the average bids with similar arguments holding for the average winning bids. In the 10-period sessions with full information we often (in 6 out of 9 sessions) find an initial decline of bids followed by an increase by the end of the game, whereas in sessions with no information the decline continues until the end of the game. For the treatments with full information (PP, D/G, and FULL 10) it does not seem to influence behavior whether they are conducted in classroom or in a computer lab. If at all, there is a little more cooperation in PP and A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
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D/G than in FULL, but the basic down-and-up dynamic is mostly the same. Irrespective of the procedure, there obviously is interaction within the whole group, which is in contrast to the LOW treatment. Henceforth, we will mainly ignore the procedure of a session when we compare the effects of information. However, some sessions (PP 1, FULL 10-1, and FULL 10-5) do not fit into the down-and-up pattern. Understanding these three sessions will later become crucial for the interpretation of the experiment.
[ Figure 1 & 2]
Considering the declining average bids in FULL 10-1 and FULL 10-5, we think that coordination at a higher bid level probably just takes longer than the time framework of only 10 periods. To answer this question a series of the computerized sessions is conducted, this time for a longer duration of 25 periods. Figure 3 shows the average bids in these sessions for treatment FULL. We find that in all these 25-period sessions, sooner or later the average bids start increasing again after an initial decline.
[ Figure 3 ] Furthermore, we now find a cyclical movement of bids. Initially, bids move down and at some point they move up again. Then, after some rounds with relatively high bids, they start lowering again. We think that this is because bid cuts become more and more tempting when the bid level is high. The lower bound of average bids that has to be reached before one of the participants initiates an increase of bids is different from session to session and even from circle to circle within one session. Thus, the underlying dynamics are not very easy to compare between sessions or even within a session. However, the cyclical movement itself seems remarkable robust since we find two to three circles within each of the full information sessions with 25 rounds.
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In our LOW treatment with no information about the other markets, on the contrary, bids exhibit a downward sloping movement towards the Nash equilibrium from the beginning to the end (see Figures 4-6 If we repeat LOW for 25 periods the bid level continues to fall slowly (see Figure 6 ). After 25 periods, average bids have reduced by about 70 percent, compared to their initial distribution. Towards the end of the game, in round 21, one of the subjects makes an attempt to increase bids by choosing number 100 for some rounds. This action, however, can only be seen by the direct opponents of this subject, not by all others, and therefore does not lead to more cooperative choices. Learning direction theory distinguishes participants' reactions to situations where they won and lost, respectively. According to the theory, we expect that subjects react to their experiences by adjusting their bid downwards when they lost and upwards when they won. The data from our experiment confirms the predictions of the learning direction theory (see Table   3 ). Losers tend to lower their bid in the following period because they previously learned that their bid was higher than that of their opponent and, thus, they lost the opportunity to make a profit. In our data, losers decrease their bids in all treatments in two-thirds of the cases, but increase their bid only in 8(15)% of the cases in LOW (FULL). On average, reasonable if a participant expects that another participant for some reason might choose a bid of 100. They show that even for a very small probability of meeting someone with a bid of 100, a bid of 99 is a profit-maximising action in the duopoly case. Here we find that such behavior is reasonable since there is indeed a bid of 100 in some periods. In our case, however, no subject thinks one step further and chooses a bid of 99.
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Although Selten and Buchta's learning direction argumentation holds for all our treatments, in sessions with full information an additional component influences the decision about the change in direction. When full information about all others' decisions is provided, participants can react not only to their immediate experience, but they can also utilise the information about what is happening around. Thus, they additionally take into consideration what would have happened if they had met one of the other opponents in the previous period. More precisely, they could determine a best reply to the distribution of bids within their matching group. 6 If their own bid was lower (higher) than this best reply bid, than we could expect that they increase or keep constant (decrease) their bid in the following period to maximise their expected profit. Moreover, the size of the adjustment might depend on the size of the distance, similar to the strength of impulses in Ockenfels and Selten's experiment. We therefore run a clustered linear regression to see how the distance to the opponent's bid and to the best reply to the group matter for the bid adjustment b contain the size of the distance to the opponent's bid and to the best reply to the group in t − 1. C is a constant.
many more bid decreases than in any other treatments. On average, winners here decrease their bid in 57% and losers even in 81% of the cases. 6 In our analysis, we do that by comparing the expected profits from undercutting each of the rivals by exactly one unit. We multiply each of those 11 candidate 'undercutting bids' with the share of participants, against which a certain subject would have won with the respective 'undercutting bid' and consider the 'undercutting bid' that yields the highest expected profit in this comparison as the best reply.
7 Of course, participants in LOW do not know the best reply to the group because they are informed only about their direct opponent's bid, not about the whole bid distribution after each round. We nevertheless include a hypothetical best reply to the group into the regression for LOW in order to have a reference point to compare the FULL data with. If participants in LOW actually apply best reply strategies, they can only best reply to their immediate experience. Thus, the directions of change predicted by learning direction and best reply coincide. The direction of those reactions was already presented in table 3.
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The results from this regression are presented in table 4. First, we see that the dummy whether or not a subject won its own match is only significant in LOW but not in FULL.
Second, the distance to the opponents' bid is significant in both treatments, but the size of its influence is larger in LOW than in FULL. Both results suggest that in treatment FULL there are other strong influences on subjects' behavior than only the opponents' bid. The mere fact whether a subjects' bid was lower or higher than the best reply to the group is not significant in neither of the two treatments (a little confusing here is the negative sign of the -although not significant -variable below BR in treatment FULL). The distance to the best reply, however, has a strong negative impact on the bid change in FULL but not in LOW. This again indicates that the reaction to the distribution of bids within the matching group in FULL is intentional and not just random. The most informative case occurs in situations in treatment FULL in which learning direction theory and directional best replies to the group predict bid changes in different directions. If a participant's bid was higher than that of her respective opponent but nevertheless below the best reply to the distribution of all other bids, it might be rational to increase the bid in the following period. The same holds in the opposite case. If she won in a certain round but sees that she was really lucky because most of the other participants around actually had an even lower bid, then she might tend to decrease her bid although she won in her own A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
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match. Exactly this can be observed in the data.
In FULL, there are clearly more adjustments into the opposite direction than predicted by pure learning direction theory than in LOW. In cases where a losing bid was smaller than the best reply to the group, the bid is increased in the following period in only 13 percent of the cases in LOW. In FULL, this holds in contrast for 33 percent of the cases (see Table   5 ). This difference of loser behavior is statistically significant at the 1-percent level in a Table 5 : Loser behavior when their bid in t-1 was smaller than the best reply to the group.
For winning situations, the pattern is even more pronounced. If a subject won in a certain round, but the bid was higher than the best reply action, 58% of the reactions in this case do not follow learning direction but rather the directional best reply theory in FULL. These subjects decrease their bid although pure learning direction theory would predict a bid raise.
On the contrary, this holds only for 29% of the cases in LOW (see Table 6 ). The difference of winner behavior is statistically significant at the 1-percent level in a Chi-squared test (d.f.
= 2, p-value < 0.001). Winners whose bids were above the best reply increase their bid on average by 0.28 units under full information. In LOW, in contrast, they increase their bid on average by 1.88 units.
After qualitative directional learning we now apply a quantitative best reply mechanism to our data, still assuming that participants adjust their bid b i as a best response to the infor- Table 6 : Winner behavior when their bid in t-1 was larger than the best reply to the group.
mation they receive about the previous period. In LOW, this information is just the bid of their opponent, whereas in FULL they receive information about the whole bid distribution.
We compare the size of the bid change predicted by the best reply, b t−1 , BR f it is defined to be zero. Again, we distinguish between cases where the best reply predicts upward or downward adjustments. Taking the above definition, best reply theory captures on average 21% (18%) of the movements in which it predicts an upward adjustment in treatment FULL (LOW) and 35% (40%) of the movements in which it predicts downward adjustment. When best reply predicts no change of the bid, this prediction is correct in 27% (54%) of the cases in treatment FULL (LOW). We see that this quantitative best reply analysis leads to a lower fit to the data than the simpler qualitative directional analysis.
In cases in which b

Dynamic leadership by example
In section 3.2 we have seen that participants in the full information treatment not only learn from their own experience according to learning direction theory, but also consider If, for example, one subject increases her bid by a large number of points, this action increases the best reply of the others. From what we have seen in section 3.1 we could expect that such an individual drastic bid increase leads on average to an increase of the other bids.
8
At this point, understanding the behavior in sessions PP 1, FULL 10-1, and FULL 10-5 becomes crucial for the interpretation of the experiment. Remember that our treatments PP and FULL provide the same information as the full information treatment in the papers of Dufwenberg and Gneezy, D/G. In 6 out of those overall 9 sessions with full information, bids typically first move down and then up again. We have argued that the increase of average bids is a collective reaction to an initial increase by one participant. In session PP 1 one of our subjects selects the number 100 all the time from the beginning on. Thus, we do not find a downward movement of average bids during the first half of the experiment because many other participants constantly choose relatively high numbers from the beginning, too, hoping to be matched with this certain subject. In FULL 10-1 and FULL 10-5 basically the opposite happens. None of the subjects seriously tries to initiate a price increase, and therefore the overall bid level declines constantly until the end of the session. In all other sessions, sooner or later one of the subjects drastically raises her own bid to initiate an overall bid increase of the group. We think that the lack of leadership in the two FULL 10 sessions is because M a n u s c r i p t
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leadership by example requires a higher cognitive effort (see also the analysis in Offerman et al.), and the short duration of these sessions does not always suffice for at least one subject developing the idea of giving a good example.
To capture the dynamic effects that lead to the cyclical bid movements, we need to define what should be treated as leading behavior in the analysis. Obviously, we can speak of leadership if one subject initially increases her bid drastically with the intention to make the others follow this increase. Thus, subsequent bid increases are not contained in the definition. To be sure that such an initial bid raise is really intended to make the others follow this step we require a leading bid to fulfill two conditions. Definition: A bid b i t of player i in period t is called "leading bid" if the following conditions are satisfied:
The player i who places the leading bid is called a "leader".
First, the leading bid has to lie outside the support of the distribution of bids in the previous period. This criterion makes sure that we capture only those bid increases that cannot be explained by other theories like the impulse balance theory of Ockenfels and Selten, learning direction of Selten and Buchta, or imitation learning according to Huck et al. (1999) .
Second, we require the bid change of the leader from t − 1 to t to be considerably large.
Otherwise, we would include too many relatively small bid increases from a very low overall bid level that are obviously not intended to lead the group to more cooperation but that are nevertheless a little larger than the highest bid in the previous period. The second criterion, that a drastic bid increase should be of at least 30 units, takes two considerations into account. On the one hand, the increase should be large enough not to comprise other A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
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bid increases resulting from win experiences, but on the other hand, it should also be small enough so that all real leadership attempts are included. From the picture of individual data we decided to define initial bid increases of more than 30 units as drastic. The border of 30 units is, of course, arbitrary to some extent. However, it is selected to give more weight to the second and more important criterion not to exclude any potential leading bids. Thus, if we consider the reaction to a drastic bid increase, we will at most diminish its observed effects and therefore decrease the statistical significance in a comparison with regular rounds, but we can be sure not to amplify the difference in the comparison artificially by counting only very evident bid increases. Table 7 shows how many leading bids can be determined according to our definition in each session of the experiment. The reaction of the other participants to such a leading bid often starts with some delay. In most situations it seems as if they first wait and see what the others do. Usually only one or two of them follow the leader immediately, but the majority reacts in the second period after the leading bid was made or even later, which can exemplarily be seen from the average bids before and after a leading bid in the FULL 25 sessions in table 8. We also see that the variance in the bid distribution increases after a leading bid. We excluded the leading bid from the calculation of the average bids for two reasons: first, because this might artificially increase the observed variance, and second, because in this data we are mainly interested in the reaction of the other participants.
Thus, a statistical test of the response to a leading bid should concentrate on the bid changes from the initial bid increase in t to the main reaction in t + 2. Within all sessions with full information of our experiment and the data from Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) , we count how many participants on average increase their bid after a leading bid increase in comparison to the period where the initial bid increase took place. Subsequently, we compare this number with the average number of subjects who increase their bid from t to t + 2 if there was no drastic bid increase in the two previous periods. If people react to a leading bid in the way we assume, then we would expect that there are significantly more bid raises (and fewer bid reductions) after a bid increase than in the remaining periods of the game.
9 In fact, we find exactly this in all sessions except FULL 10-3 (see Table 9 ).
In a Wilcoxon signed rank test we can separately show at the 1-percent-level that after a drastic bid increase more participants increase (one-sided, p-value < 0.001) and fewer decrease (one-sided, p-value = 0.0019) their bid than in other periods. 10 The same holds if we compare the size of changes quantitatively (one-sided, p-value < 0.001): on average, participants have increased their bid by 11.38 in the second period after a leading bid compared to an average decrease of bids of -2.15 during the remaining periods of the game.
9 Some sessions are excluded from the analysis because it is not possible to identify clearly periods in which signals were sent. In PP 1 one subject chooses a bid of 100 from the beginning so that our criterion of a drastic bid increase is not matched. If we would include the observations from this session concerning period 1 as the signaling period, this would not change our results in any aspect. In the other cases we cannot detect any clear intention to signal according to our criteria.
10 The share of constant bids is not significantly different in both cases.
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Motivation of the leader: Efficiency concerns?
Thus, we have a reasonably clear description and explanation for the reaction we observe in response to a leading bid. Much more difficult to understand is the motivation of the subject who makes herself a leader. We cannot clearly say whether these subjects' own profit is higher due to the increase of the overall bid level. In fact, those who initiate the price increase usually face a total profit that is below the average profit of their group (see Table   10 ). This is not surprising because the leader does place a very high bid for some periods where it is very unlikely that she will have a lower bid than her opponent. A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
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that leadership seems to pay off since average profits in FULL 25-3 are even lower than in LOW 25. It might nevertheless be the case that leadership pays off for the leader, but not significantly. This is similar to the public good experiments with leadership in Gächter and
Renner (2006) and Güth et al. (2004) . Exogenously determining a leader who contributes to the public good before the other group members, they show that leadership can enhance higher contributions and therefore increase overall efficiency. The leader who gives the good example, however, does not profit from increasing efficiency in their experiments. In the following we will briefly present possible alternative explanations for why we nevertheless observe leadership. As we have seen in table 10, leadership helps to increase efficiency but does not necessarily pay off in terms of profit for the leader. We have two possible explanations why leadership occurs nevertheless. One is partially suggested by the evaluation of comments in the questionnaire, where some of the leaders (7 out of 17) explicitly state that they were hoping to increase the average price level in order to increase their own profits. Thus, they seem to overestimate their future net profit increase from inducing an increase of the overall price level and do not sufficiently take into account the profits they abandon while placing the A c c e p t e d M a n u s c r i p t
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highest bid of their group.
Another explanation would be that they strongly care about overall efficiency even if it does not pay off in terms of their own profit. In the questionnaire, 12 out of 17 leaders wrote a sentence such as 'Large numbers are good for all participants.' To find out whether efficiency concerns may play a role for leadership in our experiment, we conducted some distribution games similar to those in the paper by Engelmann and Strobel (2004) , directly after six of our FULL sessions. Participants are asked to choose between three possible distributions of money between themselves (as person B) and two others (person A and C). The three options (see Table 11 ) are designed in such a way that option 1 is the most efficient but yields the least profit for person B, and option 3, in contrast, is least efficient but yields the highest profit for person B. Option 2 is in between.
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3
Person A 20 17 12 Person B* 8 9 10 Person C 6 6 6 Most leaders (73%) indicate a relatively high willingness to pay for efficiency by choosing option 1 or 2 (see Table 12 ). The share of efficiency lovers among the non-leaders is lower (49%). Thus, at first sight there seems to be a correlation between leadership in our experiment and a high willingness to increase overall efficiency at the cost of a lower personal profit in the distribution game. However, the difference between the decisions of leaders and non-leaders is statistically not significant (Chi-squared test, d.f. = 2, p-value = 0.3113). We think that this is because efficiency concerns do interfere with endowment effects since the distribution game is conducted after the main experiment. Especially in sessions FULL 25-2 and FULL 25-4 subjects manage very well to coordinate in the bidding game and earn quite a lot of money during the main experiment. We see that several participants in those two
